What if one rattlesnake decides to change to a hawk strategy? Then he loses utility since he gets into a fight every single encounter. To a hawk, rattlesnakes act like other hawks. Clearly he's worse off than before. What if a rattlesnake switches to a dove strategy? Then, as far as behavior goes, he's no worse off, but neither is he any better off. To a dove, rattlesnakes act like other doves. Thus, we conclude that the rattlesnake strategy is an ESS. In game theory, a form of rattlesnake strategy is called "tit-for-tat." If others know (from experience if not communication) that you will retaliate, they are less likely to attack; the costs are higher than attacking a dove. Since most people are not perfect Gandhis, there is generally a cost for aggression. Overall, in human society "all investment that takes the form of protecting rights must be, in the net, socially wasteful," as James Buchanan put it. "Gains are secured from the reductions in predation-defense effort." Thus, the non-aggression principle, and the notion of rights, might be considered as a principle or strategy based on solid game theoretic and evolutionary grounds - it is an evolutionary stable strategy. Necessary Conditions for Life-Improving ActionsRights may be thought of as necessary conditions for self-ownership or social heuristics for a "society of egoists." Perhaps it is also an individually rational strategy, or an implicit contract, with or without a veil of ignorance. Suppose the following conditions are necessary for a society where people are free.
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Against Authority | page 35 |
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